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THE "ARISING UNDER" JURISDICTION OF THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
UNIFORMITY IN PATENT LAW
EMMETTE F. HALE, III*
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
created by Congress in 1982, holds the potential for an impor-
tant change in patent law. In an effort to establish uniformity in
patent law, Congress removed patent appeals from the regional
courts of appeals and placed them within the jurisdiction of the
newly created court. In this Article, Professor Hale examines re-
cent Federal Circuit decisions defining the scope of the court's
jurisdictional grant. He concludes that although these decisions
are a step toward patent law uniformity, the Federal Circuit
should abandon certain federal jurisdictional principles, such as
the well-pleaded complaint rule, in order to exercise its jurisdic-
tion over all appeals that contain substantial patent issues.
Only then will the sought-after uniformity be realized.
A MILESTONE in patent jurisprudence was reached on Octo-
ber 1, 1982, when the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) was created by the merger of the Court of
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.' This new
federal appellate court, the thirteenth court of appeals, resulted in
part from congressional reaction to the federal appellate crisis2 and
in part from an attempt to achieve uniformity in patent law.3 The
Federal Circuit possesses the jurisdiction of its two predecessor
courts as well as exclusive jurisdiction over all patent appeals.4
In this Article, the author discusses the court's jurisdictional
grant, reviews the legislative history of the Federal Circuit, and ex-
* Assistant Professor of Law and Manager, Computing Resources, University of Missis-
sippi. B.S., 1973, J.D., 1981, University of Mississippi; LL.M., 1985, George Washington
University.
Special thanks to my colleagues and friends, Professors Elyce Zenoff of George Washing-
ton University, and Bill Champion and Carolyn Ellis of the University of Mississippi.
1. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1982)).
2. From 1960 to 1983, the number of cases filed in the district courts increased 250%
with the largest growth in civil filings. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 63-64 (1985). Ap-
peals to the courts of appeals increased 686% while applications for Supreme Court review
of federal appellate court decisions rose from 870 in 1960 to 2,841 in 1982. Id. at 65, 92.
3. See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c),(d), 1295 (1982).
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amines recent cases concerning the court's jurisdiction. The author
concludes that this novel approach to appellate jurisdiction should
not be encumbered with the traditional rules of federal jurisdic-
tion. In particular, because of the legislative history and public
policy considerations underlying the Federal Circuit, the well-
pleaded complaint rule5 should not be employed to determine the
"arising under" jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. The clear man-
dates of Congress require that the Federal Circuit review all cases
in which important patent issues are raised regardless of how and
when those issues are raised. In summary, the Federal Circuit has
the inherent jurisdiction to entertain appeals in cases where sub-
stantial patent issues are raised, whether through complaints,
amended complaints, affirmative defenses, or counterclaims.
I. THE "ARISING UNDER" JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit is unique in
that it is defined in terms of limited subject matter jurisdiction
with nationwide geographic jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit has
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals that previously went to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate division of
the Court of Claims.7 Additionally, the Federal Circuit has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over certain interlocutory decisions;8 over appeals
from civil actions filed in the district courts to review decisions of
5. See infra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
7. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(d), 1295(a)(4)-(8) (1982) with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1541-45 (1976
& Supp. V 1981).
Because it was granted the jurisdiction of the old Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over: decisions with respect to applications and
interferences from the Board of Appeals and Patent Interferences, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A)
(Supp. 1985); appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks or the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with respect to applications for registration of marks
and other proceedings under 15 U.S.C. § 1071, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B) (1982); appeals
from final decisions of the United States Court of International Trade, id. § 1295(a)(5);
appeals from final determinations of the United States International Trade Commission re-
lating to unfair practices under 19 U.S.C. § 1337, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) (1982); appeals on
questions of law from "findings of the Secretary of Commerce under headnote 6 to schedule
8, part 4, of the Tariff Schedules of the United States," id. § 1295(a)(7); appeals under
section 71 of the Plant Variety Protection Act, id. § 1295(a)(8); and appeals from decisions
of the Claims Court, which succeeded the trial division of the old Court of Claims, id. §
1295(a)(3).
8. Congress has given the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction to review orders of the
district courts "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refus-
ing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Su-
preme Court," where the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit is based on § 1295. Id. §
1292(a)(1), (c)(1).
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the Patent and Trademark Office;9 over appeals from final deci-
sions of all district courts in civil actions against the United States
for $10,000 or less which are not founded upon tax, tort, or title
claims; 10 over final decisions or orders of the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board," except in discrimination cases;' 2 and over certain
final decisions of agency boards of contract appeals.' 3 Finally, the
court has exclusive jurisdiction over final decisions of district
courts in patent actions based "in whole or in part" on 28 U.S.C.
section 1338."
The most significant change resulting from the creation of the
Federal Circuit is the transfer of patent appeals from the appellate
jurisdiction of the regional courts of appeal to the Federal Circuit.
The CAFC has exclusive jurisdiction over any appeal taken from
the final decision" of a district court "if the jurisdiction of that
The Federal Circuit also has exclusive jurisdiction over "an appeal from a judgment in a
civil action for patent infringement which would otherwise be appealable to the [CAFC] and
is final except for an accounting." Id. § 1292(c)(2). Finally, although not originally available,
see Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 709 F.2d 710 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1103 (1984), the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over interlocutory permissive
appeals from the district courts in cases arising under the patent laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)
(Supp. 1985).
The Federal Circuit may issue extraordinary writs under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1651(a) (1982). The court has used this power only where necessary to aid its appellate
jurisdiction or where there is a clear abuse of discretion by a district court or a usurpation of
judicial power. See In re Newman, 782 F.2d 971 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (district court exceeded its
discretion when it authorized destruction of invention during testing); In re Mark Indus.,
751 F.2d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (clear abuse of discretion when district court ordered removal
of presumption of validity as sanction for attorney's conduct); In re Snap-On Tools Corp.,
720 F.2d 654 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (mandamus required to preserve jurisdiction of the court
where plaintiff brought an action in state court based on patent infringement and state law
causes of action, defendant removed to federal court, and district court remanded to state
court); Mississippi Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agricultural Chem. Corp., 717 F.2d 1374 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (clear abuse of discretion when district court refused to give collateral estoppel effect
to a holding of invalidity).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(C) (1982). Civil actions are cases filed in the district courts
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145 or § 146 to review decisions of the Patent and Trademark
Office. See, e.g., Fregau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(2), 1346(a)(1), (2)(b), (e), (f) (1982).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (1982).
12. Granado v. Department of Justice, 721 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Williams v.
Department of Army, 715 F.2d 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) (1982).
13. Tatelbaum v. United States, 749 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (appeal must be from an
executive agency under the Contract Disputes Act); North Am. Corp. v. United States, 706
F.2d 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Federal Circuit has no jurisdiction over appeal of case filed
under Wunderlich Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(10) (1982).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1982).
15. Historically, federal courts have required that appeals be taken only from final deci-
sions. Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 339 (1963); Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323 (1940). Unfortunately, there is no single formulation for the determination of a
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court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338" with an ex-
ception for any "case involving a claim arising under any Act of
Congress relating to copyrights or trademarks and no other claims
under section 1338(a)."'16 Section 1338 in turn vests exclusive juris-
diction in the district courts over cases which "arise under" the
patent laws. Consequently, the interaction between 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1295, which sets the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, and
section 1338, which sets the patent jurisdiction of the district
courts, defines the limits of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over
appeals in patent cases.
A. Traditional Original "Arising Under" Jurisdiction
A thorough examination of the "arising under" jurisdiction of
the federal courts is beyond the scope of this Article. However, a
brief summary is necessary because the appellate jurisdiction of
the Federal Circuit over patent appeals is defined in relation to the
"arising under" jurisdiction of the district courts.
The origin of this phrase is the United States Constitution,
which provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority.' 1 7 The Supreme Court first examined the meaning
final appealable order. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974);
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
In its short life, the Federal Circuit has addressed several times whether an order was
final for purposes of appellate review. In some cases, the court has found the contested
order not final and appealable. See Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Laboratories, Inc., 782 F.2d 992
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (denial of motion for stay of injunction pending appeal on merits not final
order); Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506 (Fed. Cir.) (order denying
j.n.o.v. and motion for new trial not final order), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 220 (1984); Baker
Perkins, Inc. v. Werner & Pfleiderer Corp., 710 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (order directing
patentee to petition Patent Office to revive abandoned reissue application on expired patent
not final order); Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340 (Fed. Cir.) (stay of district
court proceedings pending reexamination in patent office not final order), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 935 (1983); Veach v. Vinyl Improvement Prods. Co., 700 F.2d 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(order denying summary judgment on less than all claims not final order, nor is order clos-
ing discovery).
On other occasions, it has found an order final for purposes of review. See Rhone-Poulenc
Specialties Chimiques v. SCM Corp., 769 F.2d 992 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (denial of stay to permit
arbitration final and appealable); Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 736 F.2d 1508
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (order denying amendment to complaint to allege invalidity and unenforce-
ability in reply to counterclaims for invalidity, infringement, and interference final and
appealable).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1982).
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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of this provision in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.'8 In Os-
born, Chief Justice Marshall, never a miser with the power of the
federal judiciary,'9 opined that the judicial power of the federal
courts should extend to those cases in which "the title or right set
up by the party, may be defeated by one construction of the con-
stitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the oppo-
site construction."20 Moreover, in Chief Justice Marshall's view,
"[W]hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is
extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original
cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the [federal courts]
jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law
may be involved in it."'"
Despite this expansive constitutional interpretation, after Con-
gress granted the district courts jurisdiction over federal questions
in 1875,2 the Supreme Court began to give a more narrow con-
struction to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Although facially
adhering to the "original ingredient" test of Osborn, the Court for-
mulated several versions of a considerably more narrow test. In
American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.,23 Justice
Holmes articulated the widely used test that "a suit arises under
the law that creates the cause of action. 2 4 The Supreme Court
also has said that a case arises under federal law when a "right to
relief under state law requires resolution of a substantial question
of federal law in dispute between the parties. ' 25 Professor Mishkin
offers the succinct test that there must be "a substantial claim
founded 'directly' upon national law."'26 Finally, leading commen-
tators on federal jurisdiction offer the test that "arising under" ju-
risdiction is established "if in order for the plaintiff to secure the
relief sought he will be obliged to establish both the correctness
and the applicability to his case of a proposition of federal law. '2 7
18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
19. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
20. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822.
21. Id. at 823.
22. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
23. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
24. Id. at 260.
25. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).
26. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 168
(1953).
27. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 889 (2d ed. 1973).
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Even though no precise definition has emerged from the Court,
there is generally little difficulty in establishing federal question
jurisdiction if federal law expressly creates a remedy such as pro-
vided in the patent laws.28 The difficulty arises if federal law cre-
ates a duty without a corresponding remedy for its violation. While
in some cases a federal remedy has been implied to vest federal
question jurisdiction in the federal courts, 9 in other cases a federal
remedy has not been implied, thus denying jurisdiction."°
In Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.,31 the Supreme Court
found federal question jurisdiction where an important question of
federal law was an essential element in the case even though both
the right and the remedy were state-created. The Court concluded:
The general rule is that where it appears from the bill or state-
ment of the plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon the
construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and that such federal claim is not merely colora-
ble, and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the [district courts
have] jurisdiction . ... 2
Thus, the Court opened the door for suits in the federal courts on
state law causes of action where important federal questions must
be resolved during the course of trial.
The definitional uncertainty of "arising under" jurisdiction has
been ameliorated by the Court's adoption of the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule, which requires that a federal question appear on the
face of the complaint.33 In the first case to interpret the 1875 stat-
28. See, e.g., Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421 (1883). But see Shoshone Mining Co. v.
Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900) (despite congressional authorization to determine adverse min-
ing rights, no federal question jurisdiction issue existed because local rules or customs would
govern outcome).
The patent laws provide for injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys' fees for patent in-
fringement. 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283-85 (1982).
29. E.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Tunstall v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
30. E.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975);
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
31. 255 U.S. 180 (1921). In this case, a shareholder in Kansas City Tile & Trust sued to
enjoin the company from investing in farm loan bonds issued by the Federal Land Bank.
The plaintiff asserted that the congressional act authorizing the farm loan bonds was uncon-
stitutional because it was not authorized by the Constitution. Id. at 195.
32. Id. at 199. See also T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
33. Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914).
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ute, Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes,34 the Supreme Court
held that where the plaintiff brought an action under state law
alone and the defendant attempted to remove to federal court
based on a federal defense, the case did not arise under federal law
because the plaintiff did not assert a federal cause of action. Later,
the Supreme Court extended the well-pleaded complaint rule to
preclude original federal question jurisdiction where, in addition to
presenting a state law cause of action, a plaintiff asserts that fed-
eral law prevents the defendant from raising a defense, 35 or where
a possible federal defense cannot defeat the state law claim.36 Fur-
thermore, although the Court has conceded that even if a federal
question arises during the course of litigation, this alone would be
insufficient to establish "arising under" jurisdiction.3 7
Justice Cardozo expounded upon the well-pleaded complaint
rule in Gully v. First National Bank,3" explaining that the "com-
plaint itself will not avail as a basis of [federal] jurisdiction in so
far as it goes beyond a statement of the plaintiff's cause of action
and anticipates or-replies to a probable defense." 39 In other words,
"the controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint,
unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal." 0 Although
he recognized that the difficulty in defining a cause of action was
similar to that of defining causation in tort law,41 Justice Cardozo
concluded that each case must be considered on its own facts to
34. 96 U.S. 199 (1877). In this case, plaintiff landowners sued defendant miners on a
state law private nuisance theory to enjoin further mining on a river which abutted plain-
tiffs' lands. Defendants sought removal to federal court on the ground that their actions
were authorized by an act of Congress. Id. at 201-02.
35. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983)
(citing Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74 (1914)); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149 (1908).
36. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 10 (citing Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152
U.S. 454 (1894)).
37. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
38. 299 U.S. 109 (1936). In this case, Mississippi taxing authorities sued a nationally
chartered bank in state court on a contract in which the bank agreed to assume the debts
and liabilities of an insolvent bank it had purchased. At the time of the contract, the insol-
vent bank owed state taxes. Id. at 111-12. The case was removed to federal court and re-
mand was denied on the ground that Mississippi's "power to lay a tax upon the shares of
national banks has its origin and measure in the provisions of a federal statute. . . and that
by necessary implication a plaintiff counts upon the statute in suing for the tax." Id. at 112.
39. Id. at 113.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 117. Justice Cardozo, while on the New York Court of Appeals, wrote the
court's opinion in a leading case on causation. Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry., 162 N.E. 99
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1928).
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determine federal question jurisdiction; in this case, the federal
question was simply too remote.42
B. Patent Original "Arising Under" Jurisdiction
In patent cases, the jurisdiction of the district courts is based on
a specific jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1338, rather than
on the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1331.
However, because the phrase "arising under" is used in both sec-
tions, the courts have used the precedent of section 1331 in defin-
ing the jurisdictional boundaries of section 1338."3 Generally, juris-
dictional questions arise in contractual or licensing disputes
between patentees and licensees or assignees."" If a patentee re-
quests relief only under the patent statutes, jurisdiction usually ex-
ists even where a contractual question must be decided during the
course of the litigation.4 5 On the other hand, the jurisdictional
question becomes much closer when a district court is also asked to
invoke its equitable powers concerning the license or assignment.
In the seminal case of Wilson v. Sandford,4 s a patentee asked
the district court to set aside an assignment of patent rights for
nonpayment of royalties, to award profits from the time of nonpay-
ment, and to enjoin defendants from future infringement. The Su-
preme Court concluded, "The rights of the parties depend alto-
42. Id. Justice Cardozo concluded:
The most one can say is that a question of federal law is lurking in the back-
ground, just as farther in the background there lurks a question of constitutional
law, the question of state power in our federal form of government. A dispute so
doubtful and conjectural, so far removed from plain necessity, is unavailing to
extinguish the jurisdiction of the states.
Id. Justice Cardozo also found Mrs. Palsgraf's injury too remote. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 105.
43. See Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99 (1850).
44. In the seminal case of Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891), the Supreme
Court distinguished between an assignment and a license:
The patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing, assign, grant, and con-
vey, either [1] the whole patent, comprising the exclusive right to make, use and
vend the invention throughout the United States; or [2] an undivided part or
share of that exclusive right; or [3] the exclusive right under the patent within and
throughout a specified part of the United States.. . . A transfer of either of these
three kinds of interests is an assignment, properly speaking, and vests in the as-
signee a title in so much of the patent itself, with a right to sue infringers; in the
second case, jointly with the assignor; in the first and third cases, in the name of
the assignee alone. Any assignment or transfer, short of one of these, is a mere
license, giving the licensee no title in the patent, and no right to sue at law in his
own name for an infringement.
Id. at 255 (citations omitted).
45. Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479 (1915).
46. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99 (1850).
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gether upon common law and equity principles. ' 47 Even though
the patentee asked for an injunction, a recognized remedy under
the patent laws, 48 the Court held that the particular injunctive re-
lief sought was tied to the forfeiture of the contract, not to the
patent laws.4" In other words, because the district court would
have to use its equitable powers to restore title in the patentee
prior to considering the injunction, the Court held that the case
did not arise under the patent laws.
The Supreme Court in Luckett v. Delpark, Inc.,50 attempted to
harmonize the case law which followed Wilson.5 1 In this case, the
patentee brought an action against an exclusive licensee of one
patent and an assignee of another patent asking for equitable re-
lief.5 2 The Court concluded that Wilson and its progeny deter-
mined that a district court has jurisdiction over a suit by a paten-
tee for an injunction against infringement and for profits and
damages even though the complaint anticipates a defense of li-
cense or authority by making averments that would defeat those
defenses.53 The Court also reaffirmed the Wilson holding that
where a patentee sues for recovery of royalties under a license or
assignment contract, or for damages for breach of contract cove-
nants, or for specific performance, or asks the court to declare a
forfeiture of the license or to restore an unclouded title to the pat-
ent, the district court does not have jurisdiction under the patent
47. Id. at 102.
48. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1982).
49. The Court stated:
ITIhe injunction . . . is to be the consequence of the decree of the court sanction-
ing the forfeiture. [Plaintiff] alleges no ground for an injunction unless the con-
tract is set aside. And if the case made in the bill was a fit one for relief in equity,
it is very clear that whether the contract ought to be declared forfeited or not, in a
court of chancery, depended altogether upon the rules and principles of equity,
and in no degree whatever upon any act of Congress concerning patent rights.
Wilson, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 102.
50. 270 U.S. 496 (1926).
51. Cases after Wilson in which the Court held that a cause of action did not arise under
the patent laws include: Briggs v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 239 U.S. 48 (1915); Marsh v.
Nichols, Shepard & Co., 140 U.S. 344 (1891); Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46
(1888); Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613 (1882); Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U.S. 547 (1878); and
Brown v. Shannon, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 55 (1857).
Cases in which the Court held that the cause of action arose under the patent laws in-
clude: Geneva Furniture Mfg. Co. v. S. Karpen & Bros., 238 U.S. 254 (1915); Healy v. Sea
Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479 (1915); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22
(1913); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912); Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific
Bridge Co., 185 U.S. 282 (1902); and White v. Rankin, 144 U.S. 628 (1892).
52. Luckett, 270 U.S. at 501-02.
53. Id. at 510.
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laws.54 In addition, the Court concluded that a patentee cannot
confer federal question jurisdiction by requesting an injunction
based on an averment that the defendant will infringe after a for-
feiture is declared or title to the patent is restored.5 The Court
reasoned that "when the patentee exercises his choice and bases
his action on the contract and seeks remedies thereunder, he may
not give the case a double aspect .. .and make it a patent case
conditioned on his securing equitable relief as to the contract. 56
In summary, to ascertain whether a case arises under the patent
laws, the Supreme Court requires that the cause of action be deter-
mined from the complaint with attention placed on the specific re-
lief requested by the plaintiff. A request for only contractual reme-
dies, such as recovery of royalties, damages for breach of contract,
or specific performance, places the case outside the patent "arising
under" jurisdiction of the district courts. On the other hand, a re-
quest for injunctive relief to prevent future infringement does not
necessarily place the case within the patent jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts. If a district court is first required to exercise its equita-
ble powers to establish ownership of the patent in question prior to
considering the patent counts, the case is one in contract and does
not arise under the patent laws. Unfortunately, the boundary be-
tween a contract case and a patent case does not always shine with
crystal clarity. 57
C. Federal Circuit "Arising Under" Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court cases defining the limits of the "arising
under" jurisdiction of the district courts were before Congress dur-
ing its consideration of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982 (the Act). Even though the language of section 1295 employs
the magic phrase "arising under," the legislative history of the Act
reflects the underlying congressional concerns.
The Act's central purpose is "to reduce the widespread lack of
uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exists in the ad-
ministration of patent law." 58 The House and Senate Committee
Reports show that Congress intended to achieve uniformity by di-
recting patent appeals, which usually are complex and time con-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 510-11.
56. Id. at 511.
57. See Lerco Corp. v. Haley, 597 F. Supp. 517 (W.D. Ky. 1983) (district court unde-
cided whether complex licensing case arises under patent laws).
58. H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1981).
FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISDICTION
suming, away from the regional circuits to a single appellate
court.59 Congress determined that by removing the incentive to
shop for a hospitable forum, litigation costs would decrease. This
would in turn foster investment in new products and technology.
Attorneys would be in a better position to predict the outcome of
litigation and, therefore, business planning would be facilitated. In
effect, the change in the appellate route for patent appeals was
designed to have a beneficial effect on the nation's economy.60
Congress implemented these goals by defining the jurisdiction of
the Federal Circuit over patent appeals in relation to the district
court's jurisdiction-that is, if a district court had jurisdiction over
a case under 28 U.S.C. section 1338(a), an appeal would be heard
in the Federal Circuit. The "in whole or part" phrase of the juris-
dictional grant to the Federal Circuit was of major concern to op-
ponents of the Federal Circuit."' Some critics feared frivolous pat-
ent claims might be tied to substantial antitrust claims to vest
jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit. Opponents predicted that the
"in part" jurisdiction could be "a locomotive that [would] pull all
sorts of related issues into the terminal of the court's appellate ju-
risdiction" and allow the Federal Circuit to appropriate large ele-
ments of federal law.62
Congress dismissed these concerns as unwarranted, based on
general federal jurisdiction principles. The federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction and the basis for federal jurisdiction
must always be affirmatively established; there is no presumption
in favor of jurisdiction. 3 Moreover, courts strictly construe their
own jurisdiction and trial courts generally make a clear record on
jurisdictional issues. Hence, Congress determined that jurisdiction
would not be created through the pleading of "[i]mmaterial, infer-
ential, and frivolous" patent claims," and thus the "in whole or in
part" language was not too broad.6
The Senate Report also evidenced concern about the possibility
of manipulating Federal Circuit jurisdiction over patent appeals.
While the Act was intended to prevent forum-shopping on patent
59. Id. at 18; S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 19.
60. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 58, at 22-23.
61. See id. at 41.
62. Id.; S. REP. No. 275, supra note 59, at 19.
63. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 58, at 40; S. REP. No. 275, supra note 59, at 11.
64. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 58, at 41.
65. Id.; S. REP. No. 275, supra note 59, at 19.
19861
240 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:229
claims, at the same time it should not create opportunities for fo-
rum-shopping between the Federal Circuit and the regional courts
of appeals on other claims. Thus, to protect the jurisdiction of the
Federal Circuit, the Senate Report advised district judges to sepa-
rate nonpatent claims "from trivial patent claims, counterclaims,
cross-claims, or third party claims raised to manipulate appellate
jurisdiction." 66 Furthermore, the Senate Report encouraged the
Federal Circuit to transfer appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section
163167 when a patent claim was manipulatively joined to a nonpat-
ent claim.6 8
The House Report addressed the doctrines of pendent and ancil-
lary jurisdiction, which can be used to expand the jurisdiction of
the district courts." According to the Report, the House Commit-
tee expected the new court to establish "jurisdictional guide-
lines."'7 0 The Committee admonished the Federal Circuit that no
66. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 59, at 20.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1982) provides:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court . or an appeal ... is noticed for or
filed with such a court and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the
court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any
other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the
time it was filed or noticed, and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had
been filed in or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon
which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is transferred.
There are three requirements to effect a transfer under this statute:
First, the court where the action is originally filed must find that there is a want
of jurisdiction; second, the court must determine if it is in the interest of justice;
and third, that court shall then transfer the action to any such court in which the
action could have been brought at the time it was filed.
Hempstead City & Nev. City Project v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 700 F.2d
459, 462 (8th Cir. 1983).
68. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 59, at 20.
69. Although often used interchangeably, these two doctrines are distinct. Pendent juris-
diction gives the district courts discretionary power to hear claims raised by the plaintiff,
arising out of a "common nucleus of operative facts," that could not be heard in federal
court otherwise. Ancillary jurisdiction permits district courts to hear claims usually raised
by parties other than the plaintiff, such as compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims,
which are factually related to and logically dependent on claims that provide the requisite
jurisdictional basis. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 477 F.
Supp. 615, 622 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Both doctrines permit the district courts to adjudicate
all claims at the same time, rather than deciding only those claims that provide an indepen-
dent jurisdictional basis.
Although the Federal Circuit apparently has not examined the limits of ancillary jurisdic-
tion, it has been presented with several appeals of state law issues attached to federal patent
claims. See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Sundstrand Corp., 750 F.2d 952 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (misap-
propriation of trade secrets); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. 750 F.2d 947 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (misappropriation of trade secrets and unfair competition).
70. H. REP. No. 312, supra note 58, at 41.
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matter what guidelines it devised, that court's patent jurisdiction
should result in "consistent jurisprudence and a uniform body of
patent law."71
The House Report also established a "bright line" test 72 for the
exclusive patent jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: "Cases will be
within the jurisdiction of the [Federal Circuit] in the same sense
that cases are said to 'arise under' federal law for purposes of fed-
eral question jurisdiction. 1 78 The House Report contrasted this
test with the holding of Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New
England Petroleum Corp.,74 in which the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit restricted the appellate jurisdiction
of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals over cases arising
under the Economic Stabilization Act to consideration of issues
under that statute.
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT "ARISING UNDER" CASES
In its short life, the Federal Circuit has expounded upon its ju-
risdiction in two classes of cases: those involving jurisdictional dis-
putes under section 1338, and those involving attempts by plain-
tiffs to avoid Federal Circuit review. In the first class, where only
patent claims were raised in the complaint, the court has had little
trouble finding jurisdiction under section 1338.75 More difficult
questions were presented when nonpatent claims such as contract
claims were also raised in the complaint.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 604 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1979). In Coastal States, the court noted three possible ways to
allocate appeals between the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals and the regional
courts of appeals: traditional federal question jurisdiction, case jurisdiction where Economic
Stabilization Act (ESA) issues were raised in the complaint or any other pleading, and issue
jurisdiction where ESA issues and non-ESA issues would be bifurcated between the Emer-
gency Court and the regional circuit courts. Id. The Second Circuit decided that, based on
principles of federalism, the Emergency Court could only hear appeals of ESA issues; there-
fore, non-ESA issues must be addressed by the regional courts of appeals. Id. at 183-84.
Congress apparently rejected this split approach. However, because the Second Circuit dis-
cussed three alternatives, it is unclear whether Congress approved traditional federal ques-
tion jurisdiction or case jurisdiction in appeals of patent cases to the Federal Circuit.
75. See, e.g., Beghin-Say Int'l, Inc. v. Ole-Bendt Rasmussen, 733 F.2d 1568, 1570 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
19861
242 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:229
A. Jurisdictional Disputes Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1338
One of the first cases to explore the limits of section 1338 juris-
diction was C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz,76 in which a patent licen-
see filed a declaratory judgment action in district court seeking to
declare the patent invalid, the license void, and royalties not paya-
ble under the license. The district court held that it did not have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1338(a) because the license
agreement had not been terminated. The district court reasoned
that without a termination of the license, a licensee does not have
the requisite "reasonable apprehension" of an infringement suit for
a declaratory judgment action. Because there was no other inde-
pendent basis for federal jurisdiction, the district court dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, Judge Kashiwa, writing for a unanimous court, con-
cluded that the Federal Circuit has the inherent authority to de-
termine its own jurisdiction." The court reasoned that, under the
express language of 28 U.S.C. section 1295, the Federal Circuit
must determine independently whether a district court's jurisdic-
tion is based "in whole or in part" on section 1338 in order to de-
termine the scope of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction. Schwartz's
contention that the appeal of jurisdictional questions under section
1338 should go to the regional courts of appeals, leaving the Fed-
eral Circuit to consider only the merits of the case, was rejected.
Consequently, after examining the statute and its legislative his-
tory, the court held that it had jurisdiction to decide whether the
district court had jurisdiction under section 1338.78 The court then
turned to the question of whether a patent licensee can bring a
declaratory judgment action alleging invalidity without first termi-
nating the license-an issue on which the regional courts of ap-
peals were split.79 Because the Declaratory Judgment Act does not
provide an independent jurisdictional basis for suit, absent diver-
sity of citizenship, the court held that the case must arise under
76. 716 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
77. Id. at 877.
78. Id. at 878.
79. Id. at 879. The Third and Seventh Circuits have held that there is no reasonable
apprehension of an infringement suit while a license agreement is in effect. Thiokol Chem.
Corp. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 448 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019
(1972); Milprint, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc., 562 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1977). Conversely, the Second,
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits have held that repudiation of a license agreement
is not a requirement for a suit. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 567 F.2d 184
(2d Cir. 1977); Geni-Chlor Int'l, Inc. v. Multisonics Dev. Corp., 580 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1978);
Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 521 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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the patent laws for the district court to have jurisdiction. In addi-
tion, general federal jurisdictional principles provide that a case
cannot arise under federal law where the claim in the complaint is
merely a defense to a state court action."0
The court also noted that there must be a justiciable case or con-
troversy, which generally requires "a real and substantial dispute
affecting the legal rights and obligations of parties having adverse
interests. 8 1 In patent cases, this requirement means a declaratory
plaintiff must have "sufficient interest in the controversy. ' 82 Fur-
thermore, there must be "a reasonable threat that the patentee or
licensor will bring an infringement suit against the alleged
infringer."' 3
The court rejected the blanket approach that there can never be
apprehension of an infringement suit while the license is still in
force, reasoning that such preclusion would subject the licensee to
the risk of liability for infringement.84 Moreover, total preclusion
discourages suits which is contrary to the public policies of the
patent system announced by the Supreme Court in Lear v. Ad-
kins, 5 where the Court noted that a licensee is often the only
party with sufficient interest to contest patent validity. The Fed-
eral Circuit instead adopted a "totality of the circumstances" ap-
proach to determine whether there is a case or controversy arising
under the patent laws when a licensee seeks a declaration of patent
invalidity prior to termination of the license. Factors to be consid-
ered include: involvement in litigation for the recovery of royalties,
actual or threatened suits against the declaratory plaintiff's cus-
tomers, suit against other manufacturers of similar products, and
notices of infringement in trade journals.8 6 Using this approach,
the court held that the licensee had a reasonable apprehension
that the patentee might bring an infringement suit against it suffi-
cient to establish jurisdiction under section 1338.87
80. C.R. Bard, 716 F.2d at 879.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 880.
85. 395 U.S. 653 (1969). In Lear, the Supreme Court abolished the state law licensee
estoppel rule, which prohibited suits by licensees who challenged patent validity during the
term of the license. The licensee estoppel rule was based on the state law contract rule that
parties to a contract could not repudiate the contract because of later dissatisfaction with
the bargain. Id. at 668. The Supreme Court concluded that such a rule must yield to the
strong public policies underlying the federal patent system. Id. at 673-74.
86. CR. Bard, 716 F.2d at 881 & n.6.
87. Id. at 882.
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1. Claims Based on Contracts
After finding the inherent authority to make an independent de-
termination of the jurisdiction of the district courts under section
1338, the Federal Circuit began to establish the limits of section
1338 jurisdiction. At the outer limits were cases involving contract
actions with patent issues lurking in the background. For example,
in Beghin-Say International, Inc. v. Ole-Bendt Rasmussen88 the
court considered a licensing dispute where the patentee entered
into a licensing arrangement covering certain patent applications,
and where one of the licenses concerning future United States pat-
ent applications was recorded in the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice.89 In a contractual dispute over the interpretation of one of the
licenses, Beghin-Say, S.A., a French corporation, filed suit in dis-
trict court, asking the court to remove the cloud on its title to two
United States patent applications. Rasmussen moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging that
the case was a contractual dispute which did not arise under the
patent laws. Beghin-Say then amended its complaint and re-
quested that the district court declare the assignment of the two
patent applications valid as recorded, and that the assignment
vested all rights to the invention in Beghin-Say.
The district court classified the suit as a contract action and
consequently held that the case did not arise under the patent laws
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. section 1338(a).90 Because there
was no other basis for federal jurisdiction, the district court dis-
missed the complaint. After dismissal, the United States subsidi-
ary of Beghin-Say, Beghin-Say International Inc. (BSI)-a Dela-
ware corporation with its principal place of business in New
Jersey-was substituted for Beghin-Say. On appeal, in addition to
arguing that the case arose under the patent laws within section
1338, BSI asserted that diversity of citizenship now existed under
28 U.S.C. section 1332.
Chief Judge Markey, writing for the majority, noted initially
that for section 1338(a) jurisdiction to lie, the "plaintiff must have
asserted some right or interest under the patent laws, or at least
some right or privilege that would be defeated by one or sustained
by an opposite construction of those laws." 91 BSI failed to assert
88. 733 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
89. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982).
90. Beghin-Say, 733 F.2d at 1570.
91. Id.
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such a right or interest, and the case was termed a dispute over the
interpretation of a contract. Though agreements may concern fu-
ture patent applications, they do not convert a contractual dispute
from an action cognizable in state court to one arising under the
patent laws. In short, the court held that under the general rule,
"contract disputes involving patents do not 'arise under any Act of
Congress relating to patents,' as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)." 9'
The court also rejected the argument that recordation of the
contracts by the Patent and Trademark Office brought the suit
under section 1338 by evidencing their validity as title convey-
ances.93 This argument was dismissed because questions of title
conveyance are not within the purview of section 1338."4 BSI's di-
versity of citizenship argument was dismissed by holding that di-
versity of citizenship must be determined at the time of the filing
of the complaint, or the amended complaint, and cannot be
changed by substitution of parties on appeal.95 In addition, the
court dismissed BSI's argument that 28 U.S.C. section 1331, the
general federal question statute, and 35 U.S.C. section 261, the
patent assignment recordation statute, provide an independent ba-
sis for federal jurisdiction. "The short answer is that if those other
bases for the district court's jurisdiction exist in this case they are
irrelevant in this court" because the appellate jurisdiction of the
Federal Circuit is dependent on the jurisdiction of the district
court under 28 U.S.C. section 1338(a) or section 1346.96
2. Claims Based on Patents and Contracts
The Federal Circuit also has addressed the scope of the district
courts' jurisdiction under section 1338 over those cases containing
patent as well as contract issues in the complaint. For example, in
92. Id. at 1571 (quoting Combs v. Plough, Inc., 681 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1982)).
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964); Lang v. Patent Tile
Co., 216 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1954)).
95. Beghin-Say, 733 F.2d at 1572 (citing Albert v. Kevex Corp., 729 F.2d 757 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
96. Id. at 1571-72. Although Chief Judge Markey appeared emphatic that 28 U.S.C. §
1331 did not provide a basis for appellate jurisdiction, he made a curious statement in dicta.
In responding to BSI's argument that § 1331 refers to "laws" and the action involved mat-
ters of federal concern, he observed that "the outcome of the present contract action, how-
ever it may be decided in a state court or under state law, is a matter of monumental dis-
interest to the federal government." 733 F.2d at 1572. This raises the question of whether a
suit concerning an important patent issue may arise under federal law within the meaning
of § 1331, yet not arise under the patent law within the meaning of § 1338. See T.B. Harms
Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964).
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Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.,97 Air
Products terminated a license agreement with Reichhold on the
ground that the grant of a sublicense by Reichhold was contrary to
the provisions of the license. Air Products brought suit in district
court, alleging that Reichhold was infringing its patent and induc-
ing others to infringe. In addition to the traditional patent in-
fringement remedies, Air Products sought declarations that it
owned the patent in question, that Reichhold had infringed and
continued to do so, and that Reichhold induced and continued to
induce others to infringe. The district court dismissed the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the contractual dispute
had to be resolved first in order to resolve the infringement
claims.98
On review by the Federal Circuit, Judge Kashiwa, writing for a
unanimous panel, stated the general rule that "[w]here the deter-
mination of whether there has been an infringement of a patent
depends upon the construction of the provisions of a contract, and
not upon the construction of an act of Congress relating to patents,
the controversy is not one arising under the patent laws."99 Asser-
tion of a patent infringement claim is not dispositive of whether a
case arises under the patent laws. Rather, in determining subject
matter jurisdiction, a court should consider not only the language
of the complaint, but the substance of the claim as a whole. More-
over, it may consider jurisdictional facts outside the pleadings.100
The court concluded that, under Wilson and its progeny, a dis-
trict court seeking to determine whether a claim arises under the
patent laws or a licensing agreement, should analyze the com-
plaint, paying special attention to the relief sought by the plain-
tiff.101 Under this "relief sought" rule, the court held that Air
Products' suit was primarily a patent infringement suit. The court
discounted the fact that Air Products requested a declaration of
ownership because the original agreement was a license and not an
assignment as in Wilson; thus, ownership of the patent was not in
97. 755 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 22 (1985).
98. Id. at 1560-61.
99. Id. at 1561.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1562.
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dispute.1 0 2 Moreover, because the licensing agreement permitted
termination of the license, Air Products was not required to seek a
forfeiture of the license as was the patentee in Wilson 0 3
The court criticized the district court's focus on the contractual
dispute having to be resolved prior to the patent infringement
claim. 0 " The court found that the order of resolution of issues at
trial is not determinative of subject matter jurisdiction; the proper
focus is on the facts and the relief requested by the plaintiff.10 5 In
conclusion, the court held that "where a nonfrivolous complaint
states a claim and seeks relief under the patent laws, exclusive ju-
risdiction in the federal courts is thereby established. 1 0 6
3. Claims Not Based on Contracts
Although jurisdictional questions under section 1338 have tradi-
tionally involved patent licensing disputes, section 1338 is not lim-
ited to such cases. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has been faced with
the review of at least two district court jurisdictional challenges
which did not involve contractual disputes.
In Albert v. Kevex Corp.,107 the Federal Circuit considered an
unusual patent interference suit under 35 U.S.C. section 291108 in
which Kevex argued that the patents must be interfering for the
district court to have jurisdiction. Writing for the majority of an
expanded panel, Judge Rich agreed that "[aibsent interference, a
court has no power under section 291 to adjudicate the validity of
102. Id. at 1563 n.6.
103. Id. at 1563.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1563-64.
106. Id. at 1564. See also Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 273
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (court, sua sponte, concluding suit seeking relief only under patent laws
arose under patent laws even though license was involved).
107. 729 F.2d 757 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Albert sued Kevex alleging, among other things, pat-
ent interference under 35 U.S.C. § 291. Albert moved for summary judgment, contending
Kevex's patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Kevex objected that the district court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction because Albert had not established that the patents
were interfering. Under 35 U.S.C. § 253 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.321, Kevex later filed in the
Patent Office a disclaimer of the interfering subject matter and informed the trial judge of
this action. Nevertheless, the district court entered summary judgment for Albert, holding
the Kevex patent invalid. The district court did not make a finding as to whether the two
patents interfered or whether Kevex had disclaimed all interfering subject matter.
108. 35 U.S.C. § 291 (1982) provides: "The owner of an interfering patent may have
relief against the owner of another by civil action, and the court may adjudge the question
of the validity of any of the interfering patents, in whole or in part."
Interfering patents are those issued on the same invention. Albert, 729 F.2d at 760.
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any patent."10 9 Although Judge Rich cited no authority for his con-
clusions, he stated that citing a statute or a recitation in a pleading
is not enough to confer jurisdiction. The party must demonstrate
that actual interference exists.110
Judges Smith and Davis did not accept Judge Rich's view that
actual interference is a jurisdictional prerequisite under section
291. In their view, actual interference is an element of the cause of
action under section 291 rather than a prerequisite for the court to
hear the case. The judges agreed that "U]urisdiction of the district
court in an interfering patent suit depends on a good faith, non-
frivolous and substantial assertion of the existence of interfering
patents by the plaintiff." ' Moreover, Judge Davis took issue with
the holding of the majority because it required a preliminary deci-
sion on the actual interference before the district court would have
jurisdiction to decide the validity of an interfering patent." 2 Judge
Smith concluded that the district court had jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. section 1338,113 while Judge Davis found it unnecessary to
reach the question of which statute granted jurisdiction to the dis-
trict court.114
Unlike its holding in Albert, the Federal Circuit recently found
jurisdiction in another noncontractual case. In Dubost v. United
States Patent & Trademark Office,115 Dubost was denied the bene-
fit of a foreign filing date because the check for the filing fee was
unsigned." 6 Upon petition, "  the Commissioner held the earliest
109. Id. (emphasis in original).
110. Id. at 761.
111. Id. at 763 (Smith, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 764-65 (Davis, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 763 (Smith, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 764 n.1 (Davis, J., dissenting).
115. 777 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
116. Id. at 1562. Dubost filed a French application on Oct. 16, 1981. Under 35 U.S.C. §
119, Dubost had one year to file a United States application based on the French applica-
tion to receive the benefit of the earlier French filing date. Because Oct. 16, 1982, was a
Saturday, Dubost had until Monday, Oct. 18, 1982, to file a United States application based
on the French application. Dubost filed within the time period on Oct. 8, 1982. However,
because the check for the fee was unsigned, the patent office awarded Dubost a United
States filing date of Oct. 28, 1982, the date it received a signed check for the fee. Because
this date was outside the one-year grace period of § 119, Dubost was unable to antedate his
United States application. Id.
117. If a matter is "discretionary, procedural, or non-substantive" and does not relate to
the rejection of claims in a patent application, the matter must be petitioned to the commis-
sioner, not appealed to the courts. Application of Hengehold, 440 F.2d 1395, 1403 (C.C.P.A.
1971). Because the Federal Circuit adopted the precedent of its predecessor courts, South
Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982), this distinction is applicable in the
Federal Circuit.
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filing date would be that of receipt of the signed check, despite an
affidavit from Dubost's bank stating that the unsigned check
would have been honored if presented.11
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Dubost filed suit
in district court for review of the Commissioner's decision. The
district court held that it only had jurisdiction under the All Writs
Act. As such, Dubost had to demonstrate that a duty owed him
was either unfulfilled or performed in a capricious or arbitrary
manner.11 9 Because Dubost failed to make such a showing, the dis-
trict court granted the government's motion for summary
judgment.
On review, the Federal Circuit considered whether the district
court was restricted to the mandamus statute or had jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. section 1338. Judge Nies, writing for the majority,
phrased the jurisdictional issue as "whether Dubost asserted before
the district court some right or privilege which would be defeated
by one or sustained by an opposite construction of the patent
laws.' ' 2 0 However, Judge Nies noted that the Supreme Court had
recently described Holmes' test from American Well as "more use-
ful for describing the vast majority of cases that come within the
district court's original jurisdiction than . . . for describing which
cases are beyond district court jurisdiction.' 2' Therefore, the Fed-
eral Circuit did not consider it fatal that Dubost's claim was not
created by the patent laws in the same sense as the bulk of section
1338 cases.
The court examined the complaint and concluded that it stated
a right or interest that would be defeated or sustained by the con-
struction of 35 U.S.C. section 111. Specifically, if an unsigned
check satisfied the fee requirement of section 111- that the appli-
cation be "accompanied by the fee required by law"-Dubost
would gain the benefit of his foreign filing date. If the unsigned
check did not meet section 111 requirements, Dubost could not
claim priority. Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction under section 1338 because it
118. Dubost, 777 F.2d at 1563. The Commissioner concluded that the unsigned check
was not negotiable and could not have been cashed without further authorization. In addi-
tion, the Commissioner held he had no authority to waive the statutorily required filing fee.
Id.
119. Dubost v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 225 U.S.P.Q. 713, 714 (D.D.C.
1984).
120. Dubost, 777 F.2d at 1564.
121. Id. at 1565 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983)).
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must construe section 111 in order to resolve the issues in the
case.
122
B. Attempts to Avoid Federal Circuit Review
In addition to defining the scope of its dependent jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. section 1338, the Federal Circuit has considered a
second class of cases where attempts were made tooavoid Federal
Circuit review. The first reported attempt to manipulate the Fed-
eral Circuit's jurisdiction was a patent infringement suit with di-
versity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. section 1332 as the sole juris-
dictional basis. Chief Judge Markey, writing for a unanimous
panel, disapproved such a maneuver in Chemical Engineering
Corp. v. Marlo, Inc.,1 23 based on the legislative history of the Act.
He noted that the Federal Circuit is under a congressional man-
date to increase "doctrinal stability in the field of patent law." '124
In addition, Congress was concerned that manipulation of the
court's jurisdiction would lead to forum-shopping. To meet these
congressional directives, the court concluded that substance, not
form, would control the evaluation of pleadings to determine the
jurisdictional basis for suit.1 25
The court found implicit authority in the congressional mandate
"to recharacterize pleadings which would improperly evade the in-
tent of Congress. 1 26 Because the Federal Circuit has the inherent
authority to determine its own jurisdiction, the court concluded
that it had recharacterization authority in order to avoid the ab-
surd result of letting the determination of jurisdiction depend
upon a pleading decision made by the plaintiff. 127 Thus, an allega-
tion of diversity of citizenship is irrelevant where jurisdiction does
not rest exclusively on diversity but involves statutory subject mat-
122. Id. at 1565. The majority held that because the bank would have honored the check
had it been presented, the lack of negotiability of the unsigned check was immaterial. Thus,
the unsigned check was just as good as a signed, negotiable check for payment of fees. Id. at
11.
123. 754 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Chemical Engineering sued Marlo in district court for
patent infringement, seeking damages, costs, attorneys fees, and other relief. Jurisdiction
was based solely on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The district court en-
tered summary judgment in favor of Marlo and awarded costs and attorneys fees. The clerk,
sua sponte, sent the appeal to the Federal Circuit rather than to the regional circuit. Chemi-
cal sought to transfer the appeal to the regional circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Id. at 332.
124. Id. at 333.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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ter relating to patents.12 In summary, the court held that where
the complaint seeks an injunction against infringement and money
damages, attorney fees, costs, and similar relief, the district court's
jurisdiction under section 1338 is grounded in the nature of the
action. 2 '
Although Chemical Engineering involved the pleadings of the
plaintiff, the Federal Circuit also has disapproved attempts to
avoid Federal Circuit review through creative appeal schemes. In
Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc.,' 30 Bandag brought
suit against Bolser in district court for patent and trademark in-
fringement and unfair competition. Other than the filing of various
unsuccessful summary judgment motions, there was no attempt to
separate or sever the trademark counts from the patent counts.13'
After a nonjury trial, the district court found Bolser guilty of
trademark infringement but innocent of patent infringement.
Bolser appealed the trademark portion of the case to the Federal
Circuit. Rather than a cross-appeal, Bandag filed a separate appeal
of the patent issues in the Federal Circuit and moved that Bolser's
trademark appeal be transferred to the regional circuit.
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Bennett framed the initial
issue as "whether [the Federal Circuit] has jurisdiction over an ap-
peal of the final adjudication of a nonpatent claim in a case from
which issues related to a patent claim are being separately ap-
pealed.' 32 The court noted that its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
section 1295(a)(1) is over an appeal from a final decision of the
district court if the district court's jurisdiction is based "in whole
or in part" on section 1338, with an exception for cases which in-
volve a claim arising under any congressional act relating to copy-
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 750 F.2d 903 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
131. Id. at 907. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the discretionary "sev-
erance" and "separation" of claims. FED. R. Civ. P. 21 provides that "[a]ny claim against a
party may be severed and proceeded with separately." FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) provides: "The
court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be
conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party claims, or of any separate issue . ..."
Although courts frequently use "severance" and "separation" interchangeably, the effects
of FED. R. Civ. P. 21 and FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) are distinguishable. "Separate trials [under
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b)] will usually result in one judgment, but severed claims [under FED. R.
Civ. P. 21] become entirely independent actions to be tried, and judgment entered thereon,
independently." 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2387
(1971).
132. Bandag, 750 F.2d at 907.
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rights or trademarks and no other claims under section 1338(a).' 33
The court rejected the argument by Bandag that the exception of
section 1338(a) applied because only trademark issues or claims
were to be considered in the instant appeal. Although there were
two distinct claims in the complaint which could have been sepa-
rated for trial,134 there had always been but one "case" before the
district court.33 The exception in section 1338 is triggered when a
'tcase" involves only trademark or copyright claims, not merely
when trademark or copyright claims are asserted. In distinguishing
a "case" from a "claim," the court concluded that the focus should
not be on the relationship of the issues in an individual claim, but
on the collective proceedings before the district court "when
viewed pragmatically at the time of appeal."'3 6
The court found that while the case involved a trademark claim
under section 1338(a), it also involved a patent claim under section
1338(a), which had been appealed. Moreover, the trademark and
patent counts were tried together in a single case resulting in a
single judgment. Therefore, the exception to the Federal Circuit's
exclusive jurisdiction under section 1295(a)(1) was not applicable,
and the court had jurisdiction over the trademark as well as the
patent appeal. 3 7 The court reserved the question of whether it
lacked appellate jurisdiction where no appeal is brought of the pat-
ent issues tried before the district court.'
This question was answered in Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group,
Inc., s9 which involved an appeal of a copyright issue where there
was no appeal of a patent issue. In this case, Atari filed a com-
plaint in district court alleging contributory copyright infringe-
ment, unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. section 43(a), and vari-
ous state law claims.' 40 Soon after filing its complaint, Atari
obtained a preliminary injunction against JS & A for contributory
copyright infringement. Atari then moved under Federal Rules of
133. Id. at 908.
134. Judge Bennett noted that although the patent and trademark claims involved the
same parties, "the acts alleged to have given rise to each do not overlap substantially." Id.
Therefore, the two claims could have been separated for trial under FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
135. Bandag, 750 F.2d at 908. The claims were permissively joined under FED. R. Civ. P.
18(a) without objection and the claims were tried in a single case resulting in a single judg-
ment. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 908-09.
138. Id. at 908. Judge Bennett did not find any significance in the fact that the patent
issues were raised in a separate appeal, rather than by cross-appeal. Id.
139. 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
140. Id. at 1424.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISDICTION
Civil Procedure 13(i)"1 and 42(b) 142 for an order separating the
patent count for trial and judgment.143 At oral argument on the
motion, counsel for Atari stated that the sole purpose for separa-
tion was to prevent JS & A from appealing the preliminary injunc-
tion order to the Federal Circuit.'" Subsequently, the district
court granted Atari leave to separate the patent infringement
count and gave JS & A two weeks to file a motion to vacate the
order."45
Upon JS & A's appeal of the copyright issue to the Federal Cir-
cuit, Atari moved to transfer the appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Chief Judge Markey, writing
for the majority, labelled the issue a narrow one. 14 The issue was
stated as:
whether [the Federal Circuit] has jurisdiction over an appeal
from an order preliminarily enjoining contributory copyright in-
fringement when: (1) the jurisdiction of the district court ... was
based in part on 28 U.S.C. § 1338; (2) the pleadings allege a non-
frivolous, continuing claim for patent infringement; and (3) the
district court has ordered separation of the patent claim."" 47
Despite the urging of several amicus curiae, 148 the court refrained
from addressing other jurisdictional issues."4
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(i) provides:
If the court orders separate trials as provided in Rule 42(b), judgment on a coun-
terclaim or crossclaim may be rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule
54(b) when the court has jurisdiction so to do, even if the claims of the opposing
party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.
There were no cross-claims or counterclaims in this case.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) provides for the separation of claims for trial. See supra note
131 for a discussion of separation.
143. Atari, 747 F.2d at 1424.
144. Id. at 1425.
145. Id. at 1426.
146. Id. at 1427.
147. Id.
148. The court had requested that interested parties submit briefs on the scope of the
Federal Circuit's "arising under" jurisdiction. Id. Twelve organizations submitted such
briefs. Id. at n.2.
149. Id. at 1428. The court refused to address jurisdictional questions which arise when
a patent claim has been withdrawn with prejudice, because of settlement or other-
wise, before a notice of appeal is filed; a patent claim has been dismissed as frivo-
lous and the dismissal is not appealed; a patent infringement counterclaim was
pleaded in response to a complaint containing only non-patent claims; patent and
non-patent claims arising out of one nucleus of operative facts have been filed by
one plaintiff as separate cases that have not been consolidated; a complaint has
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In a comprehensive analysis of the Federal Circuit's "arising
under" jurisdiction over patent appeals, the court quoted from the
legislative history and observed that the scope of its jurisdiction
would have to be "'in accordance with the objectives of the
Act.' "15 These objectives include the elimination of specialization,
the prevention of forum-shopping, and uniformity in patent law.151
However, the court recognized that the need for uniformity in sub-
stantive patent law does not require that the Federal Circuit take
every appeal in which a patent issue is involved. In other words, "a
mere allegation that patent law is involved will not give this court
jurisdiction when that of the district court did not rest at least in
part on a continuing claim arising under the patent or plant vari-
ety protection laws. "152
In determining the scope of its jurisdiction, the court utilized
Justice Holmes' "arising under" test: "A claim arises under the
particular statute which creates the cause of action . . ,. . The
court noted that Congress had not restricted the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Circuit to judgments entered on patent claims,
but had provided jurisdiction over appeals from cases in which the
district court's jurisdiction was based in whole or in part on section
1338.154 Thus, under the plain language of 28 U.S.C. section
1295(a)(1), the court held that it had jurisdiction because Atari's
case had been continuously based in part on its patent claim under
section 1338(a). 155
The court also addressed the effect on its jurisdiction of the sep-
aration order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b). Al-
though the court made clear that the "effect" of the order, not its
"propriety," was before the court, the separation order was found
deficient. First, the order did not indicate that the patent count
was separated for trial and judgment. Second, there was no refer-
ence to pre-trial discovery matters or to issues related to defenses
raised by the defendants. Third, there was no discussion of the
been amended to give the district court jurisdiction in part on § 1338 that it did
not have over the original complaint; or similar circumstances.
Id.
150. Id. at 1428 (quoting S. REP. No. 275, supra note 59, at 20).
151. Id. at 1440.
152. Id. at 1429.
153. Id. (citing American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260
(1916)).
154. Id. at 1429.
155. Id. at 1429-30.
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trial of the copyright count or of the other counts. Finally, the dis-
trict court did not indicate that it was creating two cases. 56
The court rejected Atari's argument that the Federal Circuit can
only hear those appeals which contain judgments on a patent
claim. 15 7 In its view, such an argument was contrary to congres-
sional intent as well as to general rules of federal jurisdiction. Nor-
mally a single judgment is entered after the trial of all counts. In
addition, until all claims are adjudicated, a judgment on a sepa-
rately tried claim is generally not final and appealable. 158 More-
over, action on Rule 42(b) is procedural and has no effect on juris-
diction. Finally, Rule 42(b) cannot be used to sever claims. 59
Having determined that the effect of the separation order was
not to separate or sever the patent claims, the court examined
whether-even if the separation order had required a separate trial
and judgment on the patent count-the district court could em-
ploy such a procedural device "for the sole purpose" of ousting the
Federal Circuit from jurisdiction granted by the Act. 6 ' Although
the discretion of a district judge to manage a trial and to enter
judgments was acknowledged, the court found such a procedure
unacceptable based on legislative intent. The time for determina-
tion, which occurs upon the filing of a notice of appeal,' 6 ' and the
criteria for determination were distinguished. Because the Federal
Circuit's appellate jurisdiction under section 1295(a)(1) is depen-
dent on whether the jurisdiction of the district court was based, in
whole or in part, on a patent claim under section 1338, the jurisdic-
tion of the district court must be examined.'62 In particular, "[tihe
criteria for jurisdiction of the district court over a case are deter-
mined at the complaint stage, and a subsequent event such [as a]
156. Id. at 1426.
157. Id. at 1430.
158. An exception to this rule is a certified judgment under FED. R. Civ. P. 52(b).
159. Atari, 747 F.2d at 1430. See supra note 131.
160. Id. at 1430-31 (emphasis in original).
161. The one jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal is the filing of a notice of appeal.
United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960). In civil cases, the notice of appeal must be
filed within 30 days after entry of judgment, except where the United States is a party, in
which case the period is extended to 60 days. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1).
After filing, "any other party" may file a notice of appeal within 14 days of the first notice
or within the 30- or 60- day period. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3). In a consolidated proceeding,
"any other party" is not limited to a cross-appellant and covers other appellants as well.
Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 725 F.2d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
The district court may extend the time for filing upon a showing of excusable neglect or
good cause provided the extension is sought "not later than 30 days after the expiration of
the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a)." FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5).
162. Atari, 747 F.2d at 1431.
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separation order entered solely to direct appeals, that does not al-
ter those criteria, cannot oust the appellate court of its potential
jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions in that case. ' 16 3
The court carefully pointed out that this discussion revolved
around the fact that the separation order was entered for the sole
purpose of routing the appeal to the regional circuit.1 6' This "bla-
tant manipulation of appellate court jurisdiction" was contrary to
the statute and to the legislative intent of avoiding forum-shop-
ping. 65 Furthermore, the court predicted that this type of manipu-
lation "could result in unnecessary disputes, undue costs, and ad-
ditional mid-process litigation concerning the proper appellate
forum. e1 66 No opinion was expressed regarding a situation where a
district court creates "two distinct cases under certain proper
circumstances."1 67
Although the court found the jurisdictional statutes unambigu-
ous, it could not resist a peek at the legislative history. The court
noted the congressional concern over manipulation of the Federal
Circuit's jurisdiction through joinder of trivial and frivolous patent
claims,16 8 and that "it would be incongruous to suppose that a
Congress concerned with avoiding appellate forum shopping
through manipulative joining of trivial and frivolous patent counts
would have intended to permit appellate forum shopping by the
manipulative separation of a non-frivolous patent count at-
tempted in the present case." 69 In conclusion, the court empha-
sized that its jurisdiction "is not dependent on the mere whim of
counsel. ' 170
Also discussed were four other congressional concerns that the
Federal Circuit was bound to implement: avoiding bifurcation of
appeals, avoiding forum-shopping in nonpatent issues of law,
avoiding specialization of the Federal Circuit, and discouraging ap-
propriation by the court of areas of law not assigned to it.' 7 ' To
meet these congressional mandates, the court held that it must ex-
ercise its statutorily required appellate jurisdiction over the entire
163. Id. at 1431-32 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1434 (quoting S. REP. No. 275, supra note 59, at 30).
169. Id. (emphasis in original).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1435-38.
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case, not just over the patent claims. 72 However, in areas which
are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, the
court reaffirmed its decision to follow the law of the regional cir-
cuit in which a district court sits to avoid the district courts having
to look "Janus-like, in two directions.' 7 -
Judges Friedman and Davis, in concurrence, asserted that Chief
Judge Markey's opinion went too far.174 Judge Friedman would
have denied the motion to transfer for want of jurisdiction, reason-
ing that because the separation order was ineffective to separate
the copyright claim for separate trial and decision, the jurisdiction
of the district court was based in part on section 1338.171 Judge
Davis reasoned that the separation order did not sever the patent
claim because it was made solely to divert the appeal to the re-
gional circuit and, thus, the motion for transfer should be
denied. 7 6
Although Chief Judge Markey wrote expansively in Atari, the
Federal Circuit has not taken all appeals of nonpatent issues. It
ordered transfer to the regional circuit in USM Corp. v. SPS Tech-
nologies, Inc.,'" which involved an antitrust claim that had been
severed for separate trials. The Seventh Circuit had previously ad-
judicated all patent issues and thus only nonpatent issues re-
mained. When USM appealed a decision on the antitrust claim to
the Federal Circuit, SPS Technologies moved to transfer the ap-
peal to the Seventh Circuit.
172. Id. at 1439.
173. Id. In an earlier decision, the Federal Circuit recognized
[a] need. . . to avoid the wastefulness and uncertainty of bifurcated appeals and,
at the same time, to maintain a uniformity of guidance available to individual
district courts in such purely procedural matters as disqualification. Dealing daily
with such procedural questions in all types of cases, a district court cannot and
should not be asked to answer them one way when the appeal on the merits will
go to the regional circuit in which the district court is located and in a different
way when the appeal will come to this circuit. That potential problem is obviated,
however, when this court applies the same guidance previously made available by
the circuit ...having authority over the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1294.
In re Int'l Medical Prosthetics Research Assocs., 739 F.2d 618, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
The Federal Circuit has consistently applied regional circuit law to resolve nonpatent is-
sues in cases coming to it under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). See, e.g., Sun Studs, Inc. v. Applied
Theory Assocs., 227 U.S.P.Q. 81, 83 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (enforceability of settlement agreement
concerning patent infringement); Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015,
1029 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (trademark infringement); Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc.,
750 F.2d 903, 907-09 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (same).
174. Atari, 747 F.2d at 1441 (Friedman, J., concurring), (Davis, J., concurring).
175. Id. (Friedman, J., concurring).
176. Id. (Davis, J., concurring).
177. 770 F.2d 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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The Federal Circuit first reviewed the Atari decision, where the
court held that its subject matter jurisdiction was to be determined
at the time the complaint was filed and would not be affected by
the separation of nonpatent claims. 178 The court noted, however,
that the Atari court had reserved the question of Federal Circuit
jurisdiction "over an appeal in which the patent claims had been
withdrawn with prejudice because of settlement or otherwise,
before a notice of appeal was filed. '17 9 In addition, on several occa-
sions the Federal Circuit had exercised jurisdiction over appeals of
antitrust claims joined with patent claims which arose from the
same set of facts. 80 However, in these cases, all patent claims had
been adjudicated.
The court concluded that because the case already had been
before the Seventh Circuit twice, "[plolicies of judicial efficiency"
favored transfer.1 81 Furthermore, the court could find no hint of
manipulation of the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, as
in Atari, because the severance occurred before the creation of the
Federal Circuit. More importantly, the transfer ordered in this
case was limited to its facts; the court admonished that the result
did not suggest how it would rule in future cases.1 82
III. ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT "ARISING UNDER" CASES
The Federal Circuit has just begun to define the scope of its
unique dependent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1295(a)(1).
In C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz,183 the court held that it had the
inherent authority to determine its own jurisdiction and would not
be bound by the district court's determination under 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1338. As the court correctly pointed out, any other holding
would be "absurd." The congressional mandate against manipula-
tion of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction would be thwarted by an
unreviewable jurisdictional determination of a district court of its
jurisdiction under section 1338. The Federal Circuit would be
placed in the untenable position of being at the mercy of the dis-
trict courts and the regional courts of appeals, while at the same
time being under a congressional mandate to strive for uniformity
178. Id. at 1037 (citing Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
179. USM Corp., 770 F.2d at 1037 (emphasis in original) (citing Atari, 747 F.2d at 1428).
180. Id. (citing American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 95 (1984); Albert v. Kevex Corp., 729 F.2d 757 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
181. USM Corp., 770 F.2d at 1037.
182. Id.
183. 716 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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in patent law. By establishing its authority to determine its own
jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit has provided a mechanism to de-
fine the scope of its congressionally mandated appellate jurisdic-
tion without interference from the regional courts of appeals.
The second jurisdictional holding in C.R. Bard is less commend-
able. The court rejected a blanket requirement that a license must
be terminated before the licensee may bring a declaratory judg-
ment action seeking to invalidate the licensed patent. Instead, the
court imposed a totality of the circumstances test to determine
whether there is a controversy arising under the patent laws. Thus,
for jurisdictional purposes, the court must decide, based upon the
totality of the circumstances, whether there is a reasonable threat
that the patentee will bring an infringement suit against the licen-
see. Because a license is an agreement by the patentee not to sue
the licensee for infringement, an infringement suit seems unlikely
unless the licensee has terminated the license or is not complying
with the terms of the license. Failure to pay royalties does not gen-
erally terminate a license, but merely gives rise to a cause of action
for a breach of contract, which does not arise under the patent
laws.
A pragmatic analysis of this holding shows its weaknesses. Since
the Supreme Court abolished the licensee estoppel rule in Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins,8 patent licensing has evolved into a war between
patentees and licensees. When the licensed invention begins to
yield income, a licensee may refuse to pay further royalties on the
ground that the patent is invalid. After C.R. Bard, the licensee can
refuse to pay royalties, but not repudiate the contract, and then
bring a declaratory judgment action contesting validity. Contract
stability is thus jeopardized in patent licensing. Ultimately, paten-
tees will simply charge higher royalties to overcome the possibility
of suit.
Although the Federal Circuit expanded the jurisdiction of the
district court under section 1338 in C.R. Bard, the court later re-
fused to extend its jurisdiction to encompass a suit to remove a
cloud on title to certain patent applications. In Beghin-Say, the
court stated the general rule that for "arising under" jurisdiction, a
''plaintiff must have asserted some right or ... privilege that
would be defeated by one or sustained by an opposite construction
of those laws." 185 With respect to contractual disputes involving
184. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
185. Beghin-Say, 733 F.2d at 1570.
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patents, such cases generally do not arise under the patent laws.
Although the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that recorda-
tion of the assignments in the Patent and Trademark Office pursu-
ant to a federal statute was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the
district court, it hinted that there might be jurisdiction where
there was "a matter of monumental [interest] to the federal gov-
ernment."'1 8 However, the source and scope of this jurisdiction
were not revealed.
In Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Reichhold Chemicals,
Inc.,87 the court announced the rule that, in determining subject
matter jurisdiction, a district court must assess the substance of
the claim in addition to the language in the complaint, and it may
consider facts outside the pleadings. 188 Moreover, a district court
must pay special attention to the relief requested by the plaintiff
in determining whether the cause of action arises under the patent
laws. 189 Thus, the court appeared to signal an expansive reading of
section 1338 through the use of this broad language, especially in
the absence of Supreme Court authority to the contrary.
Indeed, in a noncontractual dispute for which there was no di-
rect Supreme Court precedent, the court found jurisdiction under
section 1338. In DuBost v. United States Patent & Trademark Of-
fice,1 90 the court held that a district court has jurisdiction under
section 1338 to review a decision by the Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks concerning the construction of a statute. The
court reasoned that under traditional "arising under" analysis, a
right or interest of the plaintiff would be defeated or sustained by
the construction given to a patent statute. Therefore, the court ex-
panded the jurisdiction of the district courts to review certain deci-
sions of the Commissioner under section 1338 rather than under
the more stringent All Writs Act.
This expansive reading of section 1338 has limits. In addition to
adhering to Supreme Court authority concerning contractual dis-
putes, the Federal Circuit refused to extend the jurisdiction of the
district courts in a patent interference case under 35 U.S.C. section
291. In Albert v. Kevex Corp.,1 91 the court held that district courts
have no jurisdiction over 35 U.S.C. section 291 interfering patent
186. Id. at 1572.
187. 755 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
188. Id. at 1561.
189. Id. at 1562.
190. 777 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
191. 729 F.2d 757 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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cases unless the patents are actually interfering. As Judge Smith
correctly pointed out in his concurrence, the majority confused ele-
ments of the statutory cause of action with the power of the court
to hear the case. If there is a "good faith, nonfrivolous, and sub-
stantial assertion" of interference, 9" the jurisdiction of the district
court to hear the case is established under section 1338.
Although the result in Albert is probably correct because the
patents were not actually interfering due to the disclaimer by
Kevex, the proper procedural device would have been summary
judgment, not dismissal for want of jurisdiction.193 The majority's
reliance on jurisdiction unnecessarily confused the power of the
court to hear the case with the statutory elements of the cause of
action. The court needlessly introduced patent law principles into
a basic jurisdiction question, and thus failed to follow the congres-
sional mandate to avoid specialization.
In addition to exploring the scope of its dependent jurisdiction
under section 1338, the court has examined attempts by plaintiffs
to avoid Federal Circuit review. In Chemical Engineering Corp. v.
Marlo, Inc.,'" the court held that where a plaintiff brought a pat-
ent infringement suit but pleaded jurisdiction based solely on di-
versity of citizenship, the district court had jurisdiction under sec-
tion 1338.' 95 The court found implicit in its jurisdictional grant
from Congress the authority to recharacterize pleadings. This con-
clusion is certainly necessary for the court to meet the congres-
sional mandate against manipulation of its jurisdiction. The court
sent a message that, in addition to reviewing the jurisdictional de-
termination by the district courts, it would independently examine
the jurisdictional basis for suits to determine whether the case ac-
tually arose under the patent laws. Thus, the court appeared to say
that in the Federal Circuit a plaintiff's pleadings will be closely
scrutinized.
The Federal Circuit also has used the legislative intent to avoid
manipulation of its jurisdiction in the appeals of cases involving
substantive nonpatent issues. In Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire
Stores, Inc.,1' the court held that where a patent and a trademark
claim were raised originally by a plaintiff in the complaint and sep-
arate appeals were taken on both claims, the Federal Circuit had
192. Id. at 763 (Smith, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 763-64 (Smith, J., concurring).
194. 754 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
195. Id. at 333.
196. 750 F.2d 903 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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jurisdiction over both the trademark and patent appeals. In
Atari,197 the court held that it has jurisdiction over an appeal of an
order granting a preliminary injunction on a nonpatent claim
where (1) the district court's jurisdiction was based in part on 28
U.S.C. section 1338, (2) a nonfrivolous claim for patent infringe-
ment was alleged, and (3) the district court had ordered separation
of the patent claim solely for the purpose of avoiding Federal Cir-
cuit appellate review. As a compromise and to avoid uncertainty in
the district courts, the Federal Circuit announced the choice of law
rule that on appeals of issues not within the exclusive subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, the court will apply the law
of the regional circuit in which the district court sits.
These holdings concerning nonpatent claim appeals are correct
under general federal question jurisdiction principles. Because the
jurisdiction of the district court under section 1338 was in each
case based on a nonfrivolous, continuing claim in the complaint
alone, the court followed the well-pleaded complaint rule. Also, the
patent claims were not separated for a separate trial and judgment
to create a new "case." Thus, although not presented on appeal,
the patent claims remained in the case to be presented in a later
appeal.
IV. ROUNDING OUT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S "ARISING UNDER"
JURISDICTION
The court has yet to face two classes of cases which will provide
the true meaning of "arising under" jurisdiction in the Federal Cir-
cuit. The first of these is where the patent issues do not arise in
the complaint but arise in the responsive pleadings of the defend-
ant. Under the traditional well-pleaded complaint rule, such a case
does not arise under the patent laws.1"' Thus, using traditional
"arising under" analysis, the district courts do not have jurisdic-
tion over such actions under section 1338.
In the second class, the nonpatent claims pleaded by the plain-
tiff are removed "under certain proper circumstances" from the
case before appeal.19 Although the court did not define "proper
circumstances" in Atari, such circumstances would probably in-
197. The patent claims were not reviewed by the Federal Circuit in Atari because the
court was reviewing an interlocutory appeal under § 1292(a). The patent claims had not yet
been addressed by the district court.
198. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
199. Atari, 747 F.2d at 1432.
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clude the furtherance of convenience, the avoidance of prejudice,
or the promotion of expedition and economy.2 00 Because Atari only
considered the situation where the sole purpose of the separation
order was to avoid Federal Circuit appellate review, the Federal
Circuit has opened the gates for many appeals involving the defini-
tion of "proper circumstances."
The Federal Circuit has been careful to exercise its appellate ju-
risdiction in harmony with the Supreme Court's "arising under"
precedent and the legislative history of the Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982. However, in view of the central congres-
sional purpose of bringing uniformity and stability to patent law,
the Federal Circuit should exercise jurisdiction in both classes of
cases. The Federal Circuit should not be bound by the well-
pleaded complaint rule. In short, the court should return to the
"original ingredient" test of Osborn as applied in Smith v. Kansas
City Title & Trust Co.,20 1 to determine the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict courts under section 1338. The well-pleaded complaint rule
evolved long before the advent of this new approach to appellate
jurisdiction. Moreover, this rule is inconsistent with the congres-
sional mandates to avoid bifurcation of appeals, to avoid speciali-
zation, and to avoid forum-shopping.
The legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act
does not require total adherence to traditional "arising under"
analysis. Although the House Report stated that cases would be
within the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit "in the same sense
that cases are said to 'arise under' federal law for questions of fed-
eral question jurisdiction," the Report noted that this approach
was in contrast to the jurisdiction of the Temporary Emergency
Court of Appeals.0 2 This statement is ambiguous because the Sec-
ond Circuit has noted that there were three choices for the juris-
diction of the Emergency Court: traditional "arising under" juris-
diction, "case" jurisdiction over all claims, and "issue" jurisdiction
over Economic Stabilization Act claims.20 3 By contrasting this case,
Congress only eliminated "issue" jurisdiction; Congress did not
specify its choice between the other two alternatives. Thus, "case"
jurisdiction remains a viable choice for the Federal Circuit.
200. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
201. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
202. Id.
202. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 58, at 41.
203. See Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F.2d 179 (2d
Cir. 1979).
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"Case" jurisdiction meets the premier mandate of Congress for
uniformity in patent law to prevent forum-shopping. Because the
Federal Circuit has found the inherent power to determine its ju-
risdiction under section 1338 independently and to recharacterize
pleadings, it also should have the inherent power to exercise juris-
diction over the entire case to meet the congressional directives.
By exercising jurisdiction over appeals of cases containing substan-
tial patent issues which form an "original ingredient" of the origi-
nal claim, whether raised initially by the plaintiff in the complaint
or later by the defendant, the Federal Circuit can implement the
policies of the Act. The exercise of such jurisdiction over all sub-
stantial patent issues will result in uniformity which eliminates the
need to shop for a hospitable forum. Moreover, because the Fed-
eral Circuit has created a choice of law rule which requires the ap-
plication of regional circuit law to nonpatent issues, the congres-
sional mandate to discourage appropriation by the Federal Circuit
of areas not assigned to it is satisfied. In short, the baggage of pre-
vious patent "arising under" cases is not applicable under this new
legislative scheme.
Although the number of patent issues that might escape resolu-
tion by the Federal Circuit under traditional "arising under" anal-
ysis may be small, quality, not quantity, should be the court's ob-
jective. The Federal Circuit has suggested that under the doctrine
of stare decisis, its precedent might be used by other courts to re-
solve these issues.2y However, because most patent appeals now go
to the Federal Circuit, the regional circuits are beginning to lose
the expertise needed to adjudicate these complex issues. The quest
for uniformity in patent law should not be impeded by uncertainty
over whether the regional circuits will apply Federal Circuit prece-
dent, or whether these courts will apply it correctly. Such a scheme
would result in the forum-shopping problems of the years prior to
creation of the Federal Circuit.
Once the Federal Circuit has established that the district courts
have jurisdiction over all cases containing substantial patent is-
sues, the court will have addressed the problem of the -manipula-
tion of its appellate jurisdiction. Because patent issues are sub-
stantial and must be addressed to conform with the congressional
mandate, there can be no legitimate reason to sever or separate
nonpatent claims. Thus, the Federal Circuit will foreclose the po-
tential for manipulation of its jurisdiction.
204. Atari, 747 F.2d at 1440.
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V. CONCLUSION
The federal appellate crisis planted the seed for the creation of
the Federal Circuit. The evils of forum-shopping induced by a lack
of uniformity in patent law germinated the seed. The result is a
unique federal appellate court with limited subject matter jurisdic-
tion and nationwide geographic jurisdiction. This novel approach
to federal appellate jurisdiction requires that traditional rules be
re-examined.
The court seems determined to follow congressional mandates to
the letter and take all cases necessary to meet the legislative intent
of the Federal Courts Improvement Act. Congress appears to have
condoned these actions for it has not restricted the jurisdiction of
the Federal Circuit, but has broadened its jurisdiction by giving
the court jurisdiction over "certified-up" questions from patent
cases under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b).20 5 In addition, the Supreme
Court has not granted certiorari in any case over which the Federal
Circuit has exercised jurisdiction; indeed, the Supreme Court re-
versed the Federal Circuit in a Merit Systems Protection Board
decision in which the court held that it did not have jurisdiction.206
The Federal Circuit has an opportunity to redefine federal ques-
tion jurisdiction over patent cases in light of the congressional
mandates. Because it is now giving life to a fresh approach to ap-
pellate jurisdiction, the court should not be burdened with the
baggage of federal jurisdiction principles such as the well-pleaded
complaint rule. The Federal Circuit can bring uniformity to patent
law by exercising jurisdiction over all appeals from cases that con-
tain substantial patent issues. Ultimately, this uniformity will fos-
ter invention and innovation-the basic purpose of the United
States patent system.
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Supp. 1985).
206. Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984) (mem.), rev'g 718
F.2d 391 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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